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A Multi-Dimensional Concept of Human Rights
in International Law
Sompong Sucharitkul *
I. Introduction
At a time and place where might can instill fright, we must harness
force to strengthen law and order; otherwise, righteousness might be
identified with wrongfulness, and the rule of international law relegated
to regulating relations among the weak and the helpless. Human rights
could not flourish in such an environment. The concept of human rights
originated in the political and philosophical thinking of the past few mil-
lennia. The concept was revived in the middle ages in the Orient and in
the West. The American and French revolutions have vividly expressed
the concept (although limited in application). The concept has now
spread world-wide and as it gains universal recognition and acceptance,
it is temporarily relapsing in a country that once championed its cause. It
is all the more opportune to recollect some of the salient features of a
concept which of necessity is multi-dimensional. This preliminary recol-
lection introduces the study of human rights in international law and
practice.
Conceptual and definitional difficulties are inherent in any study of
human rights. To avoid possible confusion I will identify and clarify the
concept of human rights in all its dimensions and manifestations.
We live in a multicultural world,' where the light in which a person
sees cultural values depends on the social environments to which he is
accustomed. To admit the reality of such a wholesome world is a giant
step toward a closer appreciation of a more tolerable concept of human
rights. If we are aware that a world of distinct cultures exists and eventu-
ally accept it, we will recognize and ultimately tolerate different cultural
values and therefore essentially different concepts of human rights. After
all, the international instruments proclaiming the Rights of Man or the
International Covenants of Human Rights merely incorporate the views
and concepts advocated by the authors and draftsmen of those instru-
ments, who have invariably been trained in Western or European legal
traditions.
Just as we may say contemporary international law has developed
from the body of customary rules of international law evolving from the
* Visiting Robert E. and Marion D. Short Professor of International Law and International
Human Rights, Notre Dame Law School; Docteur en Droit, 1954, University of Paris; D. Phil., 1955,
University of Oxford; LL.M., 1956, Harvard University. Professor Sucharitkul is a member and spe-
cial rapporteur of the International Law Commission and Vice-President of the International Acad-
emy of Human Rights, Paris. Professor Sucharitkul represented Thailand in the Sixth (Legal)
Committee of the United Nations General Assembly.
1 See L'AVENIR DU DRorr INTERNATIONAL DANS UN MONDE MULTICULTURAL, ACADEMIE DE DROIT
INTERNATIONAL: COLLOQUE 1983 (R. Dupuy ed.).
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practice of European nations in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries,
the concept of human rights as embodied in the basic international in-
struments appears to have been drawn from Western constitutional doc-
uments, substantially produced from Western European thinking. What
Westerners conceive as fundamental to promote and preserve basic
human rights, a different viewpoint may regard as superfluous, unbecom-
ing and out of tune or time. Human rights, as commonly known and
widely understood in the modern world, are essentially a European con-
cept, the consequence of prevailing economic, social, and political condi-
tions in Europe. They have been drafted by diplomats and legal experts
educated according to the European legal traditions and ideology. How-
ever, the fashionable surge of decolonization which followed General As-
sembly Resolution 1514 on the granting of independence to colonial
territories and peoples and the increasing self-consciousness of African
and Asian countries require that we recognize that the European or
Western concept is not the sole concept of human rights, but only one of
several possible concepts. We can find the notion of human rights in all
societies and at all times, in Europe as well as in Asia and Africa, in an-
tique as well as in modern Chinese philosophy, in Hinduism, Buddhism,
Christianity, Judaism, and Islam. The idea of human dignity is common
to all these concepts, which emphasize different values according to the
different conditions and diverse societies in which the human beings hap-
pen to be living.2 Human dignity and tolerance constitute the basic core
of human rights. A lesson of tolerance would be conducive to a deeper
understanding of the concept of human rights. There is no other ra-
tional option but to accept and tolerate the plurality of concepts of
human rights in the pluralistic world of today.
Tolerance, advocated by Buddha, appears to be an indispensable di-
mension of human rights. In a recent statement by Richard von Weiz-
sacker, President of the Federal Republic of Germany,3 Buddha was cited
as having told the parable of the blind men and the elephant nearly six
hundred years before the birth of Christ. Twenty-four centuries later a
German author, Lessing, expressed the same idea in his allegory about
three rings, with which he called upon Jews, Christians and Muslims to
practice tolerance. Tolerance is the way of Buddhist life. According to
von Weizsacker, "[ilt is not indifference, but an awareness of the limited
nature of human knowledge which prevents us from presenting our views
as the absolute truth and from condemning or even persecuting
others." 4
The role of the individual in different societies illustrates the plural-
ity of concepts of human rights. Minister Willibald Pahr, for instance,
singles out the individual as the principal value of the European concept
of human rights. The individual has priority over society and even God.5
According to other concepts, however, the individual has a value as an
2 See Pahr, Human Rights in a Pluralistic World, 1985 HuM. RTS. J. 101-05.
3 Speech given at the New Year's Reception for the Diplomatic Corps in Bonn, West Germany
(Jan. 19, 1985), rep4inted in Pahr, supra note 2, at 105.
4 Id.
5 Pahr, supra note 2, at 103.
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integral part of a group, only as part of the family, the tribe or even a
larger group, or the individual has value only insofar as he serves God.
In Hindu civilization and Confucianism, human rights exist in relation to
human obligations only. The idea of individuals' mutual obligations
within their community is fundamentally important. In Islam, personal
freedom lies in surrendering to the Divine will, and since absolute free-
dom belongs to God alone, the individual realizes freedom by seeking
God. According to the animistic beliefs, man is on a par with plants or
animals, part of the animated world and nothing more. Animism still has
an important influence on Japanese thinking. In Buddhism, on the other
hand, each individual finds freedom through the practice of self-training
by harnessing the trained mind to achieve absolute freedom through
meditation without reference to any divine being. As long as different
social, economic, cultural, and ideological backgrounds and traditions
exist, so will different concepts of human rights. In spite of differences in
the existing concepts of human rights, I submit that a practical approach
would be to integrate the different concepts and consolidate them into a
unified whole. A basic core of human rights exists in common among all
the different concepts, reflecting a series of irreducible humanitarian
principles determined by human dignity, recognized and respected by all
in every conceivable environment.
II. Human Rights as Legally Protected Rights
The basic elements that constitute the notion of human rights are
relatively clear whatever the concept of human rights to be examined and
adopted, and whether or not it is possible to integrate the concept. They
can be found in two words, "rights" and "human." The combination of
these two elements must be viewed in all its dimensions, and not merely
through a microscopic lens or a magnifying glass with limited angle, as-
pect or dimension. We must view human rights in their global and com-
prehensive perspective, as they cannot exist isolated from organized
society. Because of human rights, every human being has a special sta-
tus. This status presupposes the existence of a legal order or system in
force in a society which has measures designed to promote, preserve and
protect "human rights." This legal order, in turn, is superimposed one
on top of a succession of others. There are at least three dimensions of
legal order, namely, universal or global, regional or interregional, and
internal or national.
A. The Universal Dimension
To start off with, there is a world legal order regulated by interna-
tional law, the law of nations, recognizing the existence of the rights of
every human person. Violations of human rights offend the conscience
of mankind and call for remedies and readjustments wherever such viola-
tions may occur. No state can plead domestic jurisdiction as an excuse
for violating human rights. International law considers humanitarian in-
tervention or intervention for humanitarian considerations lawful. In
fact, flagrant violations of basic rights of man such as genocide,
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apartheid, international terrorism, and slavery are offenses punishable
under international law. Through legal developments in the field of pro-
tection of human rights we can now distinctly identify basic principles
supportive of human rights. International instruments have hardened
into concrete rules and crystallized norms classifying generations of
human rights.
The first such instrument of universal character is the Universal Dec-
laration of Human Rights proclaimed by the General Assembly on De-
cember 10, 1948.6 The United Nations Commission of Human Rights
prepared the draft declaration, which President Rene Cassin and First
Lady Eleanor Roosevelt coauthored. Naturally the proclamation, how-
ever well thought of, reflected the concept prevalent in the Western
world, known to Locke, Hobbes, Rousseau, and Montesguieu, and trace-
able to some extent to the American Declaration of Independence
(1776), the United States Constitution (1787), the French Declaration of
Human Rights of 1789, and the American Bill of Rights (1791). Never-
theless, one basic element was noticeably absent from the document, that
of the rights of every people to self-determination. The initiation of the
decolonization process did not make any headway until more than a dec-
ade later in Resolution 1514 of December 1960, and in an "international
bill of human rights,"7 a series of law-making international instruments
enumerating, analyzing, and clarifying two generations of human rights.
Three significant instruments of world legal order have since entered
into force, including:
1. The International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights;
2. The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights; and
3. The Optional Protocol to the Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights.
The three documents were adopted on December 16, 1966. An-
other decade went by before a sufficient number of states ratified the
covenants to bring them into force. The International Covenant on Eco-
nomic, Social and Cultural Rights entered into force on January 3, 1976
when thirty-five states had ratified. The International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights came into force on March 23, 1976 together with its
Optional Protocol which had received ten ratifications, the minimum
needed for its entry into force. The Optional Protocol provides for the
election of a Human Rights Committee, which may consider communica-
tions from any state party or from private individuals claiming to be the
victims of violation by a state party of any of the rights set forth in the
Covenant. The Committee submits annual reports to the General As-
sembly. Individual recourse to the Human Rights Committee is possible
after all available domestic remedies are exhausted. The international
6 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217, U.N. Doc. A810 (1948).
7 See International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, G.A. Res.
2200, 21 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 16) 49, U.N. Doc. A6316 (1966); International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, G.A. Res. 2200, 21 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 16) 52, U.N. Doc.
A6316 (1966); International Covenants on Human Rights and Optional Protocol, U.N. Doc. DP1627
(1976).
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control thus operates as a secondary measure after local remedies avail-
able in the domestic legal system of the state party against which a com-
plaint may be made failed.
Two generations of the International Covenants on Human Rights,
both the Civil and Political Rights (first generation), and the Economic,
Social and Cultural Rights (second generation) attach considerable im-
portance to the right of all peoples to self-determination and to enjoy
and use fully and freely their natural wealth and resources. Political in-
dependence and permanent sovereignty over natural resources are nec-
essary to human beings to enjoy any of the basic human rights embodied
in the Universal Declaration, or guaranteed and protected in the Interna-
tional Covenants. A human being under foreign colonial domination
cannot conceive of any liberty or freedom. The right to self-determina-
tion is a sine qua non of all other human rights. It belongs to every people,
and every human person must form part of a people.
B. The Regional or Interregional Dimension
Beneath the international global order exists a set of regional ar-
rangements that have started operating in various regions of the world.
A marked disparity among arrangements exists at this second regional
level. As this article has observed, the concept and principles of human
rights as contained in the universal or global documents originated in
Western civilizations. That Europe was the first region to have adopted a
convention to protect human rights and fundamental freedoms together
with eight Protocols is natural. Europe put the European Convention
into operation, and the European Court of Human Rights as well as the
European Commission of Human Rights function within the framework
of the Council of Europe.8 Following the European model, the Western
hemisphere has witnessed two parallel draft conventions: The Central
American Convention and the Inter-American Convention for the Pro-
tection of Human Rights, with their respective Central American Com-
mission and Inter-American Commission, as well as the Court of Human
Rights. 9
The Asian-African world has been more preoccupied with promot-
ing and accelerating decolonization since Bandung 1955, when the Afro-
Asian conference adopted a Joint-Communique on April 24, 1955, pro-
claiming ten principles to be followed by states in promoting world peace
and cooperation. In Section C of the Communique of 1955 the Asian-
African Conference declared its full support of the fundamental princi-
ples of human rights as set forth in the Charter of the United Nations and
took note of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights as a common
standard for all peoples and all nations to achieve. The Conference fur-
ther declared "its full support of the principle of self-determination of
8 European Conventions on Human Rights and European Convention Protocols (No. 1), Nov.
4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 222.
9 See Comparative Texts of Drafts of Regional Conventions on Human Rights, International
Commission ofJurists (Geneva). See also American Convention on Human Rights, Nov. 22, 1969,
O.A.S.T.S. No. 36, at 1.
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peoples and nations.., and took note of the United Nations resolutions
on the rights of peoples and nations to self-determination, which is a
prerequisite of the full enjoyment of all fundamental Human Rights."' 0
It also deplored the policies and practices of racial segregation and dis-
crimination which form the basis of government and human relations in
large regions of Africa and in other parts of the world. Such conduct not
only grossly violates human rights but also denies the dignity of man.
Furthermore,
[t]he Conference also discussed the problems of dependent peoples
and colonialism and the evils arising from the subjection of peoples to
alien subjugation and exploitation .... [It declared] support of the
rights of the people of Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia to self-determi-
nation and independence and urged the French Government to bring
about a peaceful settlement of the issue without delay.'
While the Asian-African Conference has not become a permanent
organization, its offsprings include the Asian-African Legal Consultative
Committee and also the nonaligned movement. There has been no
Asian Covenant on human rights as such because other problems such as
economic development and social and agrarian reforms appear to have
been more pressing. The Organization of African Unity (OAU) devoted
its attention to human rights even during its formative stage, as evi-
denced in the constituent instrument.1 2 The Islamic Universal Declara-
tion of Human Rights covered civil and political rights, economic, social,
and cultural rights as well as the right to solidarity, the right to peace and
security, and the right to environment.1 3 Unlike the Western European
region and the Inter-American system, the Afro-Asian world has not yet
set up either a working commission or a regional Court of Human Rights
for reasons of other higher priorities. The OAU was actually considering
establishing a regional commission on human rights. 14
The socialist East European region has given little or no priority to
establishing tribunals to promote and protect the rights of individuals.
There the fundamental rights belong to the states rather than the human
agents that function and exist for and on behalf of the states.' 5
C. The Internal or National Dimension
Concepts of human rights differ among various domestic or munici-
pal legal systems, where the rights of individual human beings are most
closely affected. The national system in force within a state directly and
10 Final Communique of the Asian-African (Bandung) Conference, April 24, 1955, reprinted in
SELECTED AGREEMENTS AND TREATIES AFFECTING SOUTH-EAST ASIA 31 (South-East Asia Treaty Or-
ganization 1970).
11 Id. at 32.
12 The Conference of OAU in Dakar, 1967, and the Seminar of the Economic Commission for
Africa (ECA) in Cairo, 1967. See LA PROTEZIONE INTERNAZIONALE DEL DIRITrI DELL' UoMo 321-25
(Presidenza del Consiglio dei Ministri 1979) [hereinafter PROTEZIONE INTERNAZIONALE].
13 The Permanent Arab Commission on Human Rights, 1968, Arab League.
14 The Conference of Adis Ababa, 1971, OAU and ECA. See PROTEZIONE INTERNAZIONALE, Supra
note 12, at 325-29.
15 The difference in theoretical concepts accounts for the absence of comparable legal provi-
sions in socialist constitutions.
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immediately provides whatever measures that may be desired to promote
and protect human rights. Endless exploration and examination of the
current situation, future trends, and some remote and almost forgotten
or unknown past exist in this national dimension. Early constitutional
documents such as the Magna Carta (1215)16 and the SUKHOTHAI
Stone Inscriptions of 129317 testify to the authenticity and sanctity of the
fundamental freedoms recognized in England for every English baron,
and in SUKHOTHAI's Thailand for every living being alike, whether a
Thai or a visitor. Some forms of recognition and protection have long
existed in nearly every domestic legal system to preserve and safeguard
the rights and freedoms of man, which varyingly define the object of pro-
tection of man as citizen or man as man. This article submits that most
subsequent bills of rights in Western Europe or in America refer to the
rights of man as citizen or member of the national society, rather than
man as man regardless of his nationality or absence thereof.
In theory, local remedies should be available for every possible vio-
lation of human rights committed within an existing legal system in cer-
tain regions and for every victim of such violation. Beyond this national
dimension, a second dimension of possible recourse may exist in certain
regions, as described in subsection B. A comprehensive or universal di-
mension of remedies may exist for some states and for some individuals,
as noted in subsection A. The universal legal system applies the interna-
tional covenants of civil and political rights and of economic, social, and
cultural rights as proclaimed, protected, and preserved within the overall
global system of international law. The three-tiered system thus consti-
tutes the three dimensions of protective umbrellas, the first one superim-
posing on the second and the third tiers respectively. This is known as
the systemic dimension, the dimension of the legal remedies or protec-
tions available in a particular system.
III. Human Rights and Jural Relationship
Human rights, for what they are worth, are legal rights. For the pur-
pose of the present examination human rights will be considered as legal
rights. They are legal as opposed to moral or ethical rights, and as such a
given legal system should enforce them and give them full effect, at any
level or in any dimension. Legal rights are meaningful only if they can be
correlated to the corresponding legal duties. In this connection, Profes-
sor Hohfeld's jural relationship provides a practical, analytical test to
measure the effectiveness and scope of a human right in relation to its
"correlative," i.e., the duty or obligation and the duty bearers.18 For
every human right-holder, there must be one or more correlative duty-
bearers to fulfill and implement the right. The obligation to protect
human rights or to prevent violations of them is incumbent primarily
16 Magna Carta (England 1215).
17 See Bradley, The Oldest Known Writing in Siamese, the Inscription of Phra Ram Kamhaeng of Sukhothai
1293 A.D., 6JOURNAL OF SIAM SOCImEY 1 (1909) (Stone Inscriptions of SUKHOTHAI 1293).
18 See W. HOHFELD, FUNDAMENTAL LEGAL CONCEPTIONS AS APPLIED IN JUDICIAL REASONING
(1923);J. STONE, THE PROVINCE AND FUNCTION OF LAw 115-34 (1950). See also Radin, A Restatement of
Hohfeld, 51 HARV. L. REV. 1141 (1938).
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upon the state, including its administrative and police authorities in the
first systemic dimension. In the intermediate dimension, the duty falls
on the competent regional agencies or commission to enforce the rights
by providing appropriate regional recourses. The obligation rests with
the international community itself within the world legal order to offer
redress in the ultimate dimension. Violation of a human right anywhere
is also a violation against the state as well as against the conscience of
mankind as represented by the international community, both as an inte-
gral whole and in its regional fragmentations.
When the state or international community undertakes this obliga-
tion it has usually been considered as prescribing a result without pre-
scribing any particular course of conduct or measure to be adopted by
the state or the international community. In other cases, it is possible to
conceive of such an obligation as one of conduct or means for the state
or global community to adopt without guaranteeing the desired results.
It can also be a mixed obligation, initially of means or of conduct, failing
which an alternative measure must be adopted to ensure the result re-
quired of the duty-bearer or to prevent the occurrence of a specific event
which would incur further secondary obligation to redress the injury.
Therefore we must consider the substance or the contents of each
human right by reference to the nature and scope of the correlative obli-
gation incumbent upon the state or the international community. The
duty of protection is owed to the right-holder of every recognized human
right in the manner and to the extent prescribed by law. A breach of
such an obligation violates a human right induced by the state itself,
thereby incurring the responsibility on the part of the state to offer ap-
propriate redress.
IV. Individuals as Duty-bearers of Human Rights
We should draw our attention to the possible situation where an ob-
ligation is imposed equally on every man to respect the human rights
enjoyed by his fellow men. This is sometimes referred to as the basic
"duties of man" or "human duties" correlating to the "rights of man" or
"human rights." Contemporary experts on human rights have not yet
warmly received the concept of fundamental "human duties," fearing
that recognizing and accepting "human duties" might be seen as a con-
venient pretext and used destructively to impair or undermine "human
rights."
Reference to such duties can be found in the Universal Declaration
of Human Rights 1948. Article 29 provides:
(1) Everyone has duties to the community in which alone the
free and full development of his personality is possible.
(2) In the exercise of his rights and freedoms, everyone shall be
subject only to such limitations as are determined by law solely for the
purpose of securing due recognition and respect for the rights and
freedoms of others and of meeting the just requirements of morality,
public order and the general welfare in a democratic society.
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(3) These rights and freedoms may in no case be exercised con-
trary to the purposes and principles of the United Nations.' 9
To guard against abuse by states, Article 30 provides:
Nothing in this Declaration may be interpreted as implying for
any State, group or person any right to engage in any activity or to
perform any act aimed at the destruction of any of the rights set forth
therein.20
The African Charter and the Arab Declaration clearly support the
existence of duties incumbent upon individual beings for the respect and
protection of human rights for everyone. Human duties are consistent
with religious teachings in Hinduism, Islam, Confucianism and also in
Buddhism. The counterpart of civil rights can be seen in the require-
ment of civic duties for citizens in Western Civilizations. Yet it may take
another decade before the concept of human duties becomes a living
reality.
V. Human Rights Belonging to Every Human Person
Far more fundamental than the acceptance of a more comprehensive
legal concept of human rights is the very definition of "man" itself. It is a
great shame to admit at this point that humanity has not yet been recog-
nized as a constitutive element of international law, although it has in
effect just begun to influence legal thinking and developments in certain
fields and in some aspects. Some examples are areas of humanitarian
law, the laws of war, the Geneva Conventions of 1949, and the concept of
"common heritage," which essentially embrace international law with its
protective role in regard to promoting and protecting human rights.
A "man" for the purpose of the enjoyment of human rights must be
understood in the biological sense of "homo sapiens." The expression
"man" must include everyone, every human person, not only Christian
or European, as was the thesis of Hugo Grotius, 2 1 or the various bills of
rights, which refer merely to the constitutional rights of certain types of
man, or citizens or exclusively certain members of the human kind, e.g.,
citizens, Romans, French, English, or Americans. The rights of man
should really belong to man as such and not to man in the restricted
sense, meaning only American, or White, or Christian, or Japanese, or
Muslim, or male, but man regardless of any such qualifying denomina-
tion. The definition of man was not so extensive during the formative
period of international law after the Treaty of Westphalia when Grotius'
direct influence did not extend beyond the confines of Christendom, to
whom his treaties were addressed-the Rulers and the Free and In-
dependent Nations of Christendom (Ad Principes populosque liberos Orbis
Christianie) .22
It was not until Bandung in spring of 1955 that the Asian-African
19 See Universal Declaration of Human Rights, supra note 6, at 71.
20 Id.
21 Grotius, Dejure Belli ac Pads Libri Tres, in GROTUS READER 233-44 (F. Kelsey trans. 1925).
22 See generally H. GRonus, THE FREEDOM OF THE SEAS (R. Magoffin trans. 1916).
1987]
NOTRE DAME LAW REVIEW
Conference began to pinpoint the very weakness of human rights as de-
clared by the Universal Declaration of 1948. The Declaration referred to
the right of every people to self-determination, a prerequisite to real en-
joyment of human rights by every human person. Without the injection
of the right of self-determination, granting independence to colonial
countries and peoples, there can be no room for human rights. The
General Assembly in 1960 reintroduced this new Asian-African concept
in a unanimous resolution and expressly incorporated it in the first prin-
ciples contained in the International Covenants of Human Rights of
1966. By doing so, they defined "man" more extensively and meaning-
fully without excluding any man. Human rights are still denied to those
who have not yet attained full self-government. Their status of "man"
has not been fully recognized.
The preambles to the Charter of the Organization of African Unity
of May 25, 1963 clearly reflects the concern expressed at Bandung in
1955. Freedom, equality, justice, and dignity are the declared objectives
of the African peoples, who are determined as ever to fight against neo-
colonialism in all its forms. Among the avowed purposes of the organiza-
tion are to eradicate all forms of colonialism from Africa and to promote
international cooperation having due regard to the Charter of the United
Nations and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.
Draft Article 1 of the Central American and the Inter-American Con-
ventions on Human Rights contains an undertaking by party states
to respect the rights and freedoms recognized herein and to ensure to
all persons subject to their jurisdiction the free and full exercise of
those rights and freedoms, without any discrimination for reasons of
race, color, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national
or social origin, economic status, birth or any other social condition. 23
The phrase "all human beings" is comprehensive enough to reflect the
full meaning of human rights. This is natural as the party states have
invariably experienced the taste of colonialism from which they have for-
tunately been liberated, long before the start of the decolonization pro-
cess in Asia and Africa. Article 1 of the Inter-American Convention,
which came into force on July 18, 1978 among some Latin American and
Caribbean States, stipulates that for purposes of the present convention,
"every human being is a person."' 24
For Asian, African, and Latin American countries, as distinguished
from European and former colonial powers, the priorities for the enjoy-
ment of human rights lie in the treatment of all people as human per-
sons. This treatment is preconditioned upon the right of self-
determination. Countries outside of the European orbit place greater
emphasis on the granting of independence to colonial countries and peo-
ples, 25 the elimination of all forms of racial discrimination, 26 the sup-
23 American Convention on Human Rights, supra note 9, at art. 1.
24 PROTEZIONE INTERNAZIONALE, supra note 12, at 226.
25 Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, G.A. Res.
1514, 15 GAOR Supp. 16, U.N. Doc. A4684 (1960).
26 International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, March 7,
1966, 660 U.N.T.S. 195.
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pressing and punishing of the crime of apartheid, 27 and possibly also the
determining of the status of refugees. 28 International conventions in
these fields necessarily reinforce the fuller enjoyment of the rights of
man by every human person.
VI. Geographical Dimensions
The problem of human rights is ubiquitious. It challenges mankind
everywhere and at all times, especially at present. We cannot dissociate
the time dimension from the dimension of the location in which we must
see human rights in the perspective of an operative legal system. A par-
ticular locality may be better known for successfully implementing or
protecting civil and political rights with far less emphasis on the eco-
nomic, social, and cultural rights, or caring much less whether there is
any tolerance for different opinions, tenets, or beliefs within the same
geographical confines. What is seemingly weak in this country, such as
the enforcement of desegregation or integration of busing, schooling or
housing, may find its strongest point elsewhere. What appears to present
insuperable difficulties in the United States with its unique history of eco-
nomic, social, and cultural developments may seem quite pointless in
other lands where pluralism has always unquestioningly prevailed. Simi-
larly, what seems to be very strong in this country, such as notably the
freedom of the press (although not always of expression and opinion)
and the smooth functioning of the democratic process, may be danger-
ously weak elsewhere. But such strength as exists in Western democracy
may be unwanted or undesirable in the Orient, where an identical brand
of democracy does not seem to be working because it is either out of time
or indeed out of place.
The moral to be drawn when we explore the geographical dimension
is clear and readily understood: Human rights conceptually and realisti-
cally must fit in the actual location or situation. The concept and practice
of human rights may vary in contents as well as in emphasis and priority.
Thus, what is needed in the United States may not be needed in Pakistan
or China, and vice versa. The right to life in Asia and Africa presupposes
freedom from hunger, or the right to food, and freedom from disease or
the right to good health, which are far more urgent there than the right
to demand "habeas corpus" or the right to vote in a general election.
Freedom of information and communication may imply the right to give
and to receive accurate information and not simply freedom to receive
guidance or limited exposure to news coverage by the media. The no-
tion of "minimum standard" is susceptible to differing interpretations
and therefore receptions. To a Latin American audience, a claim of
"minimum standard" by the United States translates into terms of a
claim of compensation for nationalization. To an Asian or African na-
tional, the same claim for "minimum standard" by Afro-Asian countries
refers to an insistence on nondiscrimination on racial grounds or ab-
27 International Convention on the Suppression and Punishment of the Crime of Apartheid,
G.A. Res. 3068, 28 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 30) at 166, U.N. Doc. A9030 (1974).
28 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, July 28, 1951, 189 U.N.T.S. 137.
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sence of segregation or apartheid in the Western World. For all that, we
can state with assurance that no country can impose its views or concept
of human rights or its needs or priorities on others. Each legal system
has its own predilections, its own trends, and its own progressive devel-
opments. Harmonization is a slow process that may only be achieved
through greater tolerance, wider appreciation of views, feelings, and po-
sitions of other systems, and gradual adaptation of one's viewpoint by
taking into account the viewpoints of others. In the ultimate analysis, a
healthy development of human rights depends on the likelihood of con-
solidating and possibly integrating all the salient humanitarian principles
acceptable in every legal system. The dignity and worth of man should be
accorded top priority in any event.
VII. Concurrence, Overlapping and Conflict of Human Rights
at Various Levels
Given two or three generations of human rights, each of which is
composed of different rights, any expert on human rights must compare,
restructure, or realign and readjust the order of priorities of the different
generations of human rights in various fields and areas of human activi-
ties. These rights may overlap and compete with one another or at times
even contradict one another at the same or different levels or dimen-
sions. The first task to perform in selecting the rights is to attune the
specific human right problem by the time dimension with the location
dimension, so as to attain a more meaningful and more tenable position.
As an example of measuring human rights in a location, several out
of a hundred persons, if given a free choice, may opt to reside in the
United States and relatively fewer would freely prefer to move to another
country of comparable rank or status, such as the Soviet Union. This test
is still far from conclusive as a yardstick for measuring the amount of
appreciable human rights enjoyable by a person who has the opportunity
to exercise his or her option. Such a test, although inconclusive as a
thermometer to measure the degree of exercisable human rights, never-
theless fairly indicates a climate of opinion favorable to the amount of
respect for and enjoyment of human rights in the United States. On the
other hand, those who may opt for the Soviet Union must also have com-
pelling personal reasons that prompt each of them to choose to live in
that country rather than in the United States. For want of a more precise
and decisive criterion to measure the contents of human rights enjoyable
in each case, the possibility of freedom of exit or entry may serve as an
objective guide. In contrast, the enjoyment of other types of human
rights may be difficult to compare in each case.
VIII. Conclusion
One lesson that may be learned from experience is the need to avoid
all forms of mutual recriminations in an effort to promote and protect
human rights in all dimensions. Tolerance and human dignity should
lead to that conclusion. Constructive criticism can be useful if it inten-
sively concentrates on self-improvements, adjustments, and adaptations.
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National amelioration is welcome while international interference in the
internal affairs of other countries, allegedly to secure better observance
of human rights, may at this time and age be best discouraged. One state
does not have the right to interfere with the affairs of another state, ex-
cept in the context of the international protection of human rights al-
ready adopted in a series of international conventions.
To uphold one notion of human rights gives no ground for violating
another, more settled rule of international law, or indeed an imperative
norm which admits of no derogation. Thus, it is pointless to insist on any
civil and political rights for peoples who do not even have the right of
self-determination or the right to political independence and territorial
integrity. The right to a sane and healthy life is obviously more impor-
tant to most people than the right to vote, the right to strike, or freedom
of association. The right to work should not be confused with requisi-
tioning forced labor, nor unemployment with the right to rest and recre-
ation. Recognizing freedom of conscience or religion may result in
tacitly accepting the practice of class distinctions or approval of a caste
system. The right to food does not imply the practice of force-feeding or
the denial of the practice of voluntary fasting or Ramadan. The right to
education must be supported by free and to some extent compulsory pri-
mary education. Freedom of education and information apparently con-
tradicts with compulsory education and controlled information. A
balanced approach to a constructive study to improve existing measures
for the protection of human rights requires greater endeavors to learn
and a clearer display of understanding and tolerance of different values,
concepts, and dimensions of human rights without mutual recriminations
or polemics. Such recriminations are worse than pointless in peaceful
pursuit of greater enjoyment of basic human rights and fundamental
freedoms.
If this introductory paper has served to widen the horizon and
dimensions of human rights or indeed broadened the mind and outlook
of its readers, its objective will have been more than fulfilled. All that is
required for improving continuingly respect for human rights is self-ex-
amination. If each nation can put its house in order, every human person
can be truly free from bondage. Peace of mind is needed most as we
enter the third generation of human rights with the right to peace, soli-
darity, and environment posing a challenge to mankind. It is all the more
urgent that in preparing to form a new generation of human rights, en-
lightened governments should recognize the inherent rights of man en-
shrined in existing international instruments through ratifying these
international instruments.2 9
29 See generally the unison of views and unanimity of frustration expressed by American authors in
U.S.RATIFICATION OF THE HUMAN RIGHTS TREATIES: WITH OR WITHOUT RESERVATIONS (R. IUllich ed.
1981).
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